By Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm (auth.), Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar (eds.)
This booklet constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth foreign Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in long island, manhattan, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.
The 15 revised complete papers awarded have been conscientiously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers compile novel paintings from such assorted fields as machine technological know-how, Operations learn, man made Intelligence and allotted structures that target modeling, implementation and evaluate of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent innovations over a various set of products. they're geared up in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and tools.
Read Online or Download Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems: AAMAS 2004 Workshop, AMEC 2004, New York, NY, USA, July 19, 2004, Revised Selected Papers PDF
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Additional info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems: AAMAS 2004 Workshop, AMEC 2004, New York, NY, USA, July 19, 2004, Revised Selected Papers
P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu. Efﬁcient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica, 69(5):123759, 2001. 7. V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002. 8. C. Mezzetti. Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Efﬁciency and full surplus extraction. Technical report, University of North Carolina, February 2003. 9. R. Mirrlees. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 38:175208, 1971. A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations 29 10.
Mechanism 1 will chose one of these solutions, so the total cost to all agents is $100(n−1)+$10 000, and no agent pays any tax. For n = 10, this amounts to $10 900. A VCG mechanism chooses the overall best solution: buy a group ticket on British Air. The total expense is $110n, but on top of this each agent has to pay a tax of $(110 − 100)(n − 1). Thus, the total expense for all agents is $110n + $10n(n − 1). For n = 10, this amounts to $2 000, signiﬁcantly less than with Mechanism 1. In fact, the VCG scheme will be better as long as n < 33.
On randomly generated constraint optimization problems, it can be seen that the loss of agent utility due to the lack of PE is in general much smaller than the loss they would incur through the taxes in a VCG mechanism. The mechanism has much better performance than previous proposals, and shows an interesting new direction for solving social choice problems. 32 B. Faltings We model social choice problems as general constraint optimization problems. In Section 2, we formally deﬁne the framework and give an example of a social choice problem formulated in this way.